Part 5 in Gary Hammonds' new series looking at Britain's crumbling education system.
Author: Gary Hammonds
Britain's education system is in disrepair, in a new series of articles, Gary Hammonds explores how we got to this point and how we can fix Britain's education system.
A key area that requires improvement is the extent to which the English education system prepares children and young people fully for their adult lives, with particular emphasis on their careers and employment options. The failure to invest in or provide sufficient technical instruction has left England lagging behind its competitors, and the state’s notable reluctance to intervene is hampering international industrial competitiveness, as well as the life prospects of those who lose from current arrangements. An emphasis on academic qualifications and education alienates too many and properly supports too few.
How to best provide a system of technical education? This has been a perennial – perhaps the perennial – question that the English education system has failed to answer. An 1884 Royal Commission on technical instruction reported that the schooling in Germany was “overwhelmingly superior”. It commented that, on the continent, “the dense ignorance so common among workmen in England is unknown.” The English pre-occupation with eyeing up, but falling short of emulating, the European approaches, which seem to involve a peculiar and suspicious envy of the German system in particular, is evident at every major turning point in education policy. When Connell said that “technical education in England was the Cinderella of education… unplanned, inadequately financed, and looked on without enthusiasm by employers, employees and educators”, it was an accurate sketch of 1910; the troubling fact is that it would have been similarly accurate when he said it in 1980, or even today.
Butler, of the 1944 Act, said that “Equality of opportunity would remain something of an empty phrase if children entered the period of compulsory schooling from conditions of family deprivation, or left it to pursue what Churchill called blind-alley occupations".
Joseph, in the Sunday Times in 1984, spoke of the “bottom 40 percent” who left underqualified, with their potential unfulfilled. The purported claims of both the Butler Act of 1944 and the Baker Act of 1988 are informed by these similar perceptions of the consequences of the failure to properly build a program of technical instruction. Was to be a rebalancing of the system so that Vocational Education and Training (VET) was given proper resources and parity of esteem. Both Acts failed to achieve their goals in this area, as have every other effort to do so to date, to varying degrees.
Hankey’s report in 1945 identified the post-war training needs necessary for England to keep up with her neighbours. The Percy report of the same year recommended the expansion of higher technical education, for similar reasons, claiming that VET needed to be “more responsive and adaptable to the needs of industry.” Another notably recurrent problem in this policy area manifested itself in this report: the Committee advocated for the creation of further technical education providers who would deliver courses “of a standard comparable with that of University degree courses”, but were not “able to reach agreement regarding the title of the technological qualifications which will correspond with the University degree.” The desire but failure to create a system of vocational qualifications paralleled the already-established academic qualifications, which were treated with genuine parity of esteem, and this has plagued policy-makers ever since.
These reports were not heeded. The Crowther Report of 1959 noted that, throughout the 1940s and 1950s, most people aged sixteen or over were untouched by education.
Employers released their young workers completing apprenticeships for non-workplace VET, but they – facing little incentive – tended not to do so for their non-apprenticed young workers, so that “most of those who leave school at fifteen rapidly lose all contact with education.” This was not perceived, particularly, as a problem for the employee or the employer, because the stability and ready availability of low-skilled jobs discouraged, or at least failed to actively encourage and incentivise, school-leavers from seeking further education, training and qualifications. Arguably, the labour market and conditions - or at least the pursuit of full employment - meant that this was to nobody’s disadvantage. There were jobs, and some nominal dignity given to those performing them. But the societal patterns were unfair; the already-disadvantaged were further disadvantaged by the exclusive nature of VET. In 1956, the Ministry of Education showed that they echoed Butler’s concerns from the 1940s and foresaw Baker’s concerns from the 1980s. They noted that other developed nations were “making an immense effort to train more scientific and technical manpower, and we are in danger of being left behind.”
That White Paper of 1956 introduced Colleges of Advanced Technology, which educated students to degree level. But – again – these institutions lacked the resources and the status of the universities. The Robbins Report of 1963 recommended, instead of seeking to improve the quality and respect for VET, that patterns of post-mandatory education should shift so that fewer people were receiving a vocational or technical education, and more students went to university for a traditionally conceived liberal arts education. The Conservatives accepted these proposals, facing little to no opposition from Labour. The share of students in the post-16 population accessing VET fell from a fifth to only a tenth.
Robbins had claimed to be a universalist, and rhetorically at least, there was an inclusive agenda. “Our golden rule was that places in higher education should be available to those suited by ability and attainment, and who wished to attend.” However, inclusive of a ‘golden rule’ that is, in principle, though, working-class students were not, for the most part, even sitting the O-Levels and A-Levels required for access, let alone securing the necessary grades. This remains true today, with patterns of access to post-compulsory education being more strongly determined by socioeconomic status than anything else. This is true globally , but is particularly pronounced in England.
When Labour gained power in the 1960s, they sought to build a post-16 sector that was democratic and both locational and vocational. A White Paper of 1966 introduced the polytechnics, developed from existing technical institutions. They suffered from underfunding and had no parity of esteem, it also endured academic drift, where they began focusing on specialised style single-honours degrees, costing them their unique identity and purpose, and casting them in the mould of lesser-status universities.
The proportion of young people accessing apprenticeships fell from their heights in the 1960s, but over the 1970s, there was an overall increase in the participation rate in VET for adults and school-leavers who would “previously have entered directly into the labour market” but for whom there now simply weren’t the jobs. The rising unemployment that drove this change, a result more of a declining global industrial standing than of anything else, ushered in an era of change. With fewer jobs than workers, employers felt emboldened to ask for a better-trained workforce without necessarily providing the investment of time and resources necessary for such training.
The Ruskin speech marked a turning point. Callaghan told his audience in 1976 that he was “concerned on [his] journeys to find complaints from industry that recruits from schools do not have the basic tools required to do the job.” He concluded that schools should best prepare children for
“a lively, constructive place in society, and also fit them to do a job of work. Not one or the other, but both.”
The Industrial Training Act of 1964 had set up Industrial Training Boards (ITBs) to oversee the design, delivery, assessment ad funding of sector-specific VET using a system of levies and grants, and these were the structural architecture Callaghan envisaged. And whilst he spoke in terms of satisfying business interests through using the tools available to the state, the Further Education Unit of the 1970s seemed focused on asking what personal qualities students would need to best cope in – as well as contribute to – the world of their adult lives, advocating for the curriculum to include questions of moral value, the creation of politically aware citizens, and for the emphasis to be on lifelong learning. But neither the architecture nor the principles survived much into the Thatcher years. The 1981 Employment and Training Act reduced the number of ITBs to only eight, and the Youth Training Scheme of 1983 put millions of already-disadvantaged unemployed school-leavers into low-quality training programmes, with institutional and systemic barriers reinforced, once again, through relative underfunding.
Thatcher’s policies introduced the same tensions into post-16 education, which were introduced to schools. On the one hand, it was a huge exercise in the centralisation of control. In 1981, Westminster had limited control over VET, but today it enjoys absolute primacy. The state now decides what is taught to whom, and how this is to be managed and measured. This centralisation is at odds with the European system we so routinely look to with envy, with its emphasis on local social partnerships and an empowered tier of local, municipal or federal governments. Thatcher’s successful attacks on unions and local government bodies weakened them so that their involvement in the design and maintenance of sectoral or regional advocacy groups is limited, a barrier to effective social partnership work. The English system’s failure to emulate the sectoral or regional bargaining collectives of Europe has been one of the causal factors in its failure to emulate their more successful VET programmes.
As well as overseeing a process of centralisation, the Thatcher years saw a growing marketisation of post-16 education. Further Education providers were ‘liberated’ from local political control in 1992, found themselves with increasing financial autonomy (including the freedom to financially fail), were subjected to heavy regulation and monitoring from the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education, and competition and consumer choice were viewed as the theoretical drivers of system improvement. The decision in 1993 to refuse the calls from the Macfarlane Committee to combine Further Education colleges and Sixth Forms into one unified system of post-16 education, which really would have created socially mixed student bodies, entrenched patterns of social segregation, so that it was not just different courses and life-trajectories, but different physical buildings and resources which were the dividing lines.
The control wielded over public bodies like Further Education colleges was never wielded over private organisations, because neoliberalism views firms as black boxes whose inner-workings are not appropriate for state intervention or regulation. Employers reasserted their rights to train, which manifested as a right not to train. Left to voluntarism, the number of apprenticeships fell dramatically from the heights of around 250,000 in the 1960s to around 50,000 by 1990. Policy makers have struggled ever since to reverse this process of ‘employer retreat’. “Thirty [now forty] years ago, the large British firms in every major town accepted the cost of apprenticeship and technical education as a kind of social overhead which they willingly paid; now it’s ‘can’t pay and won’t pay” from both small and large firms.” The Education Act of 1986 stipulated that local authorities should shape the governing bodies of their educational institutions to reflect local business interests and to secure the direct involvement and input of business. The reality of these arrangements is that the interests of capital were given primacy, but the demands made on those in ownership of it were reduced. Employers were given greater control but not required to invest time or resources. This was a result of the Conservative government’s beliefs in the importance of market forces and the profit motive as the two tools of societal improvement. These forces were inserted into the further education system itself, with ‘efficiency savings’ seeing its staffing profile reduced by 20,000 between 1992 and 1997.
By the time of 1997, the post-16 system was fully shaped by market forces, and – serving as it now did the vast majority of school-leavers – its influence on people’s lives was enormous. The New Labour years, the coalition government and the Conservative governments which followed did little to challenge the underlying assumptions or structures of the sector’s arrangements. Starmer and Phillipson have made no moves to do so, as of yet. As with schooling, 1988 marks the defining turning point – quasi-marketisation and semi-privatisation are the defining characteristics of the system as it exists.
New Labour strengthened the involvement of business in post-16 education. Providers were compelled to respond to the interests of capital, and to involve employers in both the design and the delivery of courses. The argument was that “there can be no room in the system for vocational programmes which do not evolve to meet changing business needs” and providers must adapt to “changed business requirements”. There were efforts made to widen access, notably the introduction of the Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) in 2004, which sought to encourage disadvantaged young people to stay on in education and training post-16.
Over their tenure, the New Labour governments redesigned 14-19 qualifications along separate vocational and academic pathways. There was an emphasis on providers of further education reaching those in need of adult education, as well as serving school-leavers. The situation they sought to create was one with an alignment of vocational and academic routes served by a unified qualification system to create more routes for the traditionally disadvantaged to access higher education. However, despite the recommendations of the Tomlinson Report, no unified system of qualifications was introduced. 14-19 vocational qualifications were introduced alongside and parallel to GCSEs and A-Levels; they were separate, undervalued, and the false equivalence led to game-playing and irrelevance. Gordon Brown argued that “the foundation of our new approach is that for the first time young people in Britain will be offered education to 18 and for the first time also, a clear pathway from school to a career”. But there was not “a” pathway. Whilst the Conservative government under Thatcher had legislated for a common curriculum to 16, Blair’s Education and Inspection Act created two distinct and divergent academic and vocational pathways from 14. Entry patterns were, as ever, cut chiefly along socioeconomic lines. Such divisions position young people in their proper and traditional place in existing social hierarchies, whilst the false rhetoric of opportunity and social mobility implied that a new social hierarchy was being built.
Gove’s era of reforms followed a similar pattern. He oversaw another reform of vocational qualifications so that they paralleled, rather than nominally converged with, GCSEs and A-Levels. The changes to performance and accountability measures reduced some of the gaming of the New Labour years, though it was still the case that the complexity of qualifications resulting from approaches to VET led to their being too frequently undervalued and too infrequently understood. Labour’s reforms had undervalued vocational qualifications, recasting them in the form of academic ones and, in doing so, alienating those they were intended for. League table distortions led to their misuse and further devaluation. Gove did rightly recognise these problems, but the extent to which they have been successfully solved is less evident.
Apprenticeships saw a return to favour with the coalition government’s tenure. Labour had launched the National Apprenticeship Service in 2009, but in 2010, the government funding for apprenticeships was increased, and the number of apprenticeships rose. When ‘learner loans’ were introduced in 2013 – covering half the costs of apprenticeships for those aged 24 or over – the number of apprenticeships dropped again, in line with the effective reduction in funding that this constituted. When the apprenticeships levy was introduced in May 2017 – encouraging employers to participate in VET by taking 0.5 per cent of the annual pay bill of any firm with an annual pay bill of more than three million pounds, to be kept in reserve by the government and used only to subsidise that employer’s cost of taking on apprenticeships – the number of apprenticeships fell further. The government originally hoped to secure more than three million apprenticeships by 2020. However, since its introduction, there has been a reduction in the number by more than one hundred thousand, and there are now fewer than half a million born each year. The levy’s complexity, inflexibility and costs to non-levy payers have been offered as justification for this failure of the policy to deliver the hoped-for increases.
So that’s the situation: distinct academic and vocational qualifications, where the latter are undervalued and misunderstood. The vocational qualifications have been subjected to academic drift under the control of middle-class policy makers, whereby a plumbing course becomes a course in reading and writing about plumbing, rather than a course about plumbing. This, although many tasks – particularly work-related competencies – can only be adequately assessed in real-world situations. “Vocational courses should employ methods that assess the vocational skills in context… at the workplace or in workshop areas.” VET has become co-opted; it is now a ‘part’ of traditional academic education, with its approaches to selection, teaching and assessment – however inappropriate those approaches are repeatedly shown to be. VET takes place predominantly in classrooms, remote and removed from the workplace, and – importantly – before the workplace has been sufficiently encountered. The assessment and certification (where needed) of work-related skills and competences should be viewed as ongoing, contextualised, and cumulative – not artificially or prematurely quantified to be made subject to the data demands of New Public Management.
There remains an income premium attached to academic qualifications that we don’t find for vocational qualifications, and the forces behind this have been known and understood for some time – but with little or nothing done to change it. This is doubly damning because there are systemic biases in wages where social class plays a part in shaping the patterns. Already-disadvantaged young people are less likely to find themselves on the more highly paid academic pathways. Then, regardless of which pathway they find themselves on, they are less likely to be paid as well as their less disadvantaged peers. The disadvantage which makes its way into the system is compounded, replicated, and widened. The very existence of pathways could be said to exacerbate this issue. Pupils make curricular choices with different degrees of knowledge and understanding of the consequences of those choices , and disadvantaged pupils are less likely to make the informed choices which show positive impacts on entrance to higher education, and ultimately, pay. The very fact of studying an applied subject at Key Stage 4 - rather than an exclusively academic, EBACC-eligible set of subjects - was sufficient to starkly increase the probability of premature departure from education.
VET in England – fairly uniquely – is still viewed as something which happens in schools and classrooms rather than on the job, and as something which delivers transferable rather than industry-specific skills. Steedman has written of the English state’s persistent failure to directly regulate VET, even faced with conclusive evidence of current arrangements failing to develop those transferable skills. This is even though transferable rather than firm-specific skills require the most intervention and investment. Both Labour and Conservative governments have, over recent decades, attempted to align the interests of employers with the providers of VET, but the inability to accurately forecast labour markets has made this of questionable utility. The supposition that the jobs market would be filled with high-skilled graduate positions was wrong, and the reality was that around eighty per cent of the new jobs created by the coalition government were low-skill, low-pay, and low-security. The deference to the interests of, but reluctance to extract fair contributions from, the owners of capital has led to a situation where the English state constantly rejects reforms which are premised on social partnership or which involve regulation of what happens inside firms or private organisations. As this process has happened alongside processes of capital being increasingly removed from local and democratic control, the consequences are an educational offer increasingly removed from the needs of the public and the worker. Employers fulfil a minimal role, delivering schemes designed and paid for by the central government. Until employer interests are aligned more closely with public interest, or the government is more willing to compel employers to act, the situation will not improve.
VET acts as a filter for entry into the jobs market, and non-participation in education after compulsory schooling can be best predicted by looking at socio-economic status. To the extent to which VET is exclusive, it excludes the already-disadvantaged from meaningful and secure employment. Admissions to post-16 study are based primarily on prior attainment, but as we have already seen, this will tend to discriminate against students from lower socio-economic status backgrounds and exclude them from more desirable programmes of study. For the academic year 2017/2018 – though the pattern holds for other years – notably more disadvantaged pupils leaving key stage 4 find themselves in further education colleges than their less-disadvantaged peers. The figures are forty five per cent and thirty four per cent accordingly. More than half of the more well-off pupils study in a sixth-form; it is closer to a third for their disadvantaged peers. Whilst not exact, this distinction between FE college and sixth form acts as a fairly neat proxy for academic and vocational tracks. This provides the greatest justification for policy change and greater investment into Further Education and VET: it will likely effect change for the very people with whom it is easiest, and most important, to secure improved outcomes. Only a marked recalibration of funding, which allocates it to the courses and institutions serving our disadvantaged communities and trains our workforce, will bring about an improved situation for England as a whole. As well as a shortage of funding, VET suffers from a democratic deficit whereby underfunded and de-scaled local authorities, and the removal of community governance as an expectation, have prevented the delivery of a fully locally informed and democratically agreed offer.
Alison Wolf has said, “We are producing vanishingly small numbers of higher technical level qualifications, while massively increasing the output of generalist bachelor degrees and low-level vocational qualifications.”
She argued that vocational education cannot return to the era of mass apprenticeships because employment patterns no longer justify trade-specific training. The certification of highly specified skills and competences, the approach particularly of New Labour, was also inappropriate because employers little understood and valued the system. Wolf argued, instead, for a higher standard of general education, and for more resources and time to be invested in transferable skills which would be of tangible value to the individual in an unpredictable labour market. The importance of the labour market to all of this cannot be underestimated: education does not exist in a vacuum. State provision of education was designed to match a class system shaped by industry as a pyramid, where three in four were manual workers. That is no longer the fate for the majority of our school leavers. With a vastly different, and frankly worse, labour market facing our young people, they too often “find themselves forced into temporary, low-paid, subsidised work presented as training or apprenticeships, or forced to take on student debt in the hope of eventually securing at least semi-professional occupation. Meanwhile, they run up a down-escalator of devaluing qualifications in lengthening periods of time in school, college and university.” Until the political will is found and then spent on creating a different future for these young people – a future filled with meaningful, secure, and well-paid work – then there is little to be gained from tinkering with the vocational training offered to them.
So the problems are that post-16 education is a landscape littered with unequal opportunities. As a result, we should strive to equalise access to provision, increase the level and targeting of funding so that it follows the young people who need it most, and seek to unify the courses and qualifications so that fewer doors are shut prematurely on opportunities for a better life. It is also a system that feeds into the labour market, so the conditions and availability of work need to be improved if the system is to function fully. And finally, it is a chance for communities to take control of their own destinies. Accordingly, well-endowed bodies should be governed by community members and should be responsive to community interests. When all this has happened, and we have an open, transparent, well-funded, and community-grounded provision which is both strongly vocational and locational, then we will have a VET system that our European neighbours may, for once, look on with envy.
New Capitalism?; Kevin Doogan; John Wiley & Sons; 2013
A history of education in the twentieth century world; W.F. Connell; Curriculum Development Centre; 1980
The Five Giants: A Biography of the Welfare State; Nicholas Timmins; 1995
Government Control in War; Lord Hankey; 1945
Higher Technological Education – Report of a Special Committee appointed in April 1944;
The Crowther Report: A report of the Central Advisory Council for Education in England; Sir Geoffrey Crowther; 1959
Breadwinners and dependants: working-class young people in England 1918-1955; S. Todd; International Review of Social History; 2007
White Paper on Technical Education; Ministry of Education; 1956
The Robbins Report on Higher Education; Lord Robbins; 1963
Shaping Higher Education: 50 Years after Robbins; C Moser; 2014
Overcoming barriers to HE; S Gorard et al; 2007
Social inequality in access to higher education: grade inflation in private schools and the ineffectiveness of compensatory education; T Neve et al; International Studies in Sociology of Education; 2017
University rankings: Do they matter in the UK?; S Broecke; 2015
Higher Education and Social Access: to the Robbins Reports; A Ross; in Higher Education and Social Class: issues of exclusion and inclusion; 2003
FE and Lifelong Learning: realigning the sector for the twenty-first century; A Green and N Lucas; 1999
A Rational Debate Based On The Facts; James Callaghan; Ruskin College Oxford Speech; 1976
14-19 and lifelong learning; Richard Pring; in Vocational Education: International Approaches, Developments and Systems; edited by L Clarke and C Winch; 2007
Education in Britain: 1944 to the present; Ken Jones; 2003
The State; D Ashton and E Keep; in Education, Skills and The Economy: The Politics of Vocational Education and Training; 2007
Skills and the limits of neo-liberalism: the enterprise of the future as a place of learning; W Streeck; Work, Employment and Society; 1989
UK Competitiveness: Moving to the next stage; M Porter and C Ketels; Department of Trade and Industry; 2003
Examining the crisis of further education: an analysis of ‘failing’ colleges and failing policies; P Goddard-Patel and S Whitehead; Policy Studies; 2000
Liberal conservatism, vocationalism and further education in England; R Fisher and R Simmons; Globalisation, Societies and Education; 2012
The decline of apprenticeship training in Britain; H Gospel; Industrial Relations Journal; 1995
The changing meaning of skill and the shifting balance of responsibility for vocational education and training – are employers calling the shots?; E Keep; Conference on Training, Employability and Employment; 2002
Rebalancing the economy; Julie Froud et al; CRESC Working Paper Series; 2011
The road to partnership? Forcing change in the UK further education sector, from ‘college incorporation’ and ‘competition’ to ‘accommodation and compliance’?; F Burchill; Employee Relations; 2001
Higher Education at Work – high skills, higher value; Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills; 2008
FE Colleges in a New Culture of Adult and Lifelong Learning; U Howard; NIACE; 2009
Educating 14-19 year olds in England: a UK lens on possible futures; A Hodgson and K Spours; London Review of Education; 2011
Mansion House Speech; Gordon Brown; 21 June 2007
Rethinking education in the era of globalisation; Terry Wrigely; in Contesting Neoliberal Education: Public Resistance and Collective Advance ed. Dave Hill; 2009
Orientations to curriculum and transition: towards the socially-critical school; S Kemmis, P Cole and D Suggett; 1983
Richard Review of Apprenticeships; Department for Business, Innovation and Skills; 2012
Learning for labour: specialist diplomas and 14-19 education; M Allen; Forum vol. 49 no. 3; 2007
Levy for success: Implementing Apprenticeships; Natalie Dixey; 2019
Apprenticeships and skills policy in England: Briefing Paper; Andrew Powell; 2020
Distributive Justice and Vocational Education; J S Halliday; British Journal of Educational Studies; 2004
New Directions in Vocational Education; Alan Rumney; 2019
Methods of Assessment; Ron Needham; in New Directions in Vocational Education; 2019
Life, work and learning: Practice in postmodernity; D Beckett and P Hager; Routledge International Studies in the Philosophy of Education 14; 2002
Returns to Education: a non-technical summary of CEE work and policy discussion; B Sianesi; Institute for Fiscal Studies and Centre for the Economics of Education; 2003
The death of human capital?; P Brown, H Lauder and S Cheung; 2019
Inequalities in school leavers’ labour market outcomes: do school subject choices matter?; C Iannelli and A Duta; 2018
Incentivising specific combinations of subjects – does it make any difference to university access?’ J Anders, M Henderson, V Moulton, and A Sullivan; National Institute Economic Review; 2018
Does what you study at age 14016 matter for educational transitions post-16?; V Moulton, A Sullivan, M Henderson, J Anders; 2018
The Changing Nature and Role of Vocational Education & Training in Europe; CEDEFOP; 2017
Mathematics in Vocational Youth Training for the Building Trades in Britain, France and Germany; H Steedman; NIESR discussion paper; 1992
A Theory of Employment Systems; D Marsden; 1999
Driving a generation: improving the interaction between schools and businesses; E Cox and B Davies; Institute for Public Policy Research; 2014
Casualisation and low pay: A report for the Trades Union Congress; M Hudson; 2014
The multiple paradoxes of state power in the English education and training system; Ewart Keep; in Vocational Education: International Approaches, Developments and Systems; 2007
What might the Tomlinson and White Paper proposals mean for vocational education and work-based learning? P Huddleston, E Keep and L Unwin; Nuffield Review Discussion Paper; 2005
Vocational Education: International Approaches, Developments and Systems; Linda Clarke and Christopher Winch; 2007
Adult Learning Survey; National Institute for Adult and Continuing Education; 2003
Education Policy: Evidence of Equity and Effectiveness; Stephen Gorard; 2018
Destinations of key stage 4 and 16-18 students, England, 2017/2018; Department for Education; 2019
Regulatory rationales beyond the economic: in search of public interest; M Feintuck; in The Oxford Handbook of Regulation; 2010
Review of Vocational Education: the Wolf Report; A Wolf; 2011
The changing working class; A Callinicos and C Harman; 1987
Betraying a generation: How education is failing young people; Patrick Ainley; 2016
The publisher is Citizen Network. Britain's Crumbling Education System. Part Five: Vocational Education and Training © Gary Hammonds 2026.
education, Inclusive Education, politics, England, Article
